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Introduction
The defining project of law and social change scholarship has been to 
answer a basic, yet fundamental, question: Can law be mobilized to contest 
the power of those who have it and build the power of those who do not?
Lucie White has spent her career, both as an academic and activist, 
working to illuminate the conditions under which power shifts and how 
lawyers contribute to social transformation.1 One of her central concerns 
has been to understand how law may be deployed to empower those whose 
lives are structured—although never completely determined—by poverty, 
discrimination, and despair. In this regard, White’s work has focused on 
when legal action contributes to the transformation of individual and group 
consciousness such that marginalized people may come to believe that change 
is possible and, most crucially, that they can be the agents of that change. 
White has emphasized consciousness, because it ultimately is the long-term, 
on-the-ground change in ideology and practice that produces sustained 
democratic transformation. Her early work, which examines change processes 
both in the United States and Africa, is associated with skepticism about 
traditional lawyering. White’s account of the welfare hearing of Mrs. G. is 
the classic cautionary tale of how a well-intentioned but misguided lawyer 
may reproduce the very client marginalization the lawyer tries to contest by 
adhering too carefully to the conventional legal script.2
Over the past decade, White’s work has charted new directions. 
Geographically, she has returned to Africa, developing a partnership with the 
Ghana Legal Resources Center to bring Harvard Law School clinical students 
1. See Lucie E. White, To Learn and Teach: Lessons from Driefontein on Lawyering and Power, 
1988 Wis. L. Rev. 699. 
2. Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the 
Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 Buffalo L. Rev. 1 (1990).
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to Ghana each year to work on human rights projects related to health 
care delivery. Intellectually, this work has generated new ideas about how 
pragmatic economic and social rights (ESR) strategies may be used to change 
consciousness, policy, and practice in an iterative and virtuous cycle. Stones 
of Hope: How African Activists Reclaim Human Rights to Challenge Global Poverty is the 
scholarly culmination of that project. Edited by White and Jeremy Perelman—a 
former Harvard Law School S.J.D. student who worked directly on right to 
health campaigns in Ghana and is now launching a clinical program at Paris’s 
Sciences Po—Stones of Hope is a foundational contribution to the law and social 
change field.
The book is impressive for both what it does—which I will turn to in a 
moment—and how it does it—which I will begin with here. The power and 
scope of the book genuinely reflect the manner in which it was conceived and 
executed: as a unique collaboration across continents between scholars and 
activists, who joined together out of a commitment to mutual learning in the 
pursuit of social transformation. My review will focus on White and Perelman’s 
central contributions for it is, of course, they who did the heavy lifting in 
developing the project’s core methodological, normative, and theoretical 
framework (the latter, in part, with Peter Houtzager from the Institute of 
Development Studies). However, it is crucial to begin by acknowledging 
the other key contributors who did the scholarly and, critically, the activist 
work that constitutes the core of the project (and provides the material for the 
book’s four case studies):
•	 Felix Morka, director of Nigeria’s Social and Economic Rights Action 
Center (SERAC), who contributed a powerful case study of his 
organization’s work to resist the state’s eviction of villagers to make 
way for a World Bank sponsored sanitation project in Badia;
•	 Zackie Achmat, founder of South Africa’s Treatment Action Campaign 
(TAC), Mark Heywood, director of South Africa’s AIDS Law Project, 
and Geoff Budlender, former director of the South African Legal 
Resources Centre, who collaborated with William Forbath, from the 
University of Texas, to produce the rich case study on TAC’s struggle 
to create and implement a national treatment plan for persons with 
HIV/AIDS;
•	 Helen Kijo-Bisimba, director of Tanzania’s Legal and Human Rights 
Centre (LHRC), who collaborated with Osgoode Hall’s Ruth 
Buchanan and the University of Toronto’s Kerry Rittich, to write the 
study on community resistance to mass evictions of the Nyamuma 
people from Tanzania’s Ikorongo animal reserve to make way for global 
eco-tourism; and
•	 Mahama Ayariga, former director of Ghana’s Legal Resources Centre 
(LRC), who, along with Katharine Young at the Australian National 
University, and Perelman, contributed the pivotal essay on how activists 
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in Nima seized upon the horrific detention of Mohammed Zakari to 
advance broader access to health care in Ghana.
The outcome of this collaborative venture is a brilliantly synthetic work, 
which manages to succeed on three distinct levels. First, it offers one of the 
richest, most sophisticated, and contextually sensitive accounts of activist 
lawyering and advocacy that exists in the field. Second, it manages, skillfully 
and carefully, to derive from the rich case studies an embedded theory of social 
change that extends far beyond the particularities to guide us toward a clear-
eyed, yet “hope”-ful account of how lawyers may help transform lives. Third, 
and finally, the book is a call to action, a searing indictment of contemporary 
development policy and simultaneously, a deep wellspring of inspiration for 
all who care about confronting the structural underpinnings of global poverty. 
It is this “third dimension” (to borrow White’s phrase3) that may well be the 
most profoundly important to its authors, who have spent their careers doing 
both the real-world and scholarly work of challenging the depredations of 
power by building community empowerment.
The Stones of Hope Project
What is the central project of Stones of Hope? The answer to that fundamental 
question is crisply asserted by its authors on the book’s very first pages: It is, 
quite simply, to understand and analyze the multifaceted ways in which lawyers 
and activists have, in direct engagement with different African communities, 
deployed ESR strategies to challenge “the violence of radical poverty” (1).
Undertaking such a project invariably demands that one choose among a 
range of approaches, all of which have unavoidable tradeoffs. A key to framing 
and critically examining Stones of Hope is therefore to be clear ex ante about 
which approach White and Perelman adopt and how it shapes the story that 
they ultimately tell. 
The primary lens through which the Stones of Hope contributors approach their 
task is, in Perelman and White’s terms, one of “historical institutionalism”: a 
mode of analysis that looks at how legal orders, patterns of behavior, and modes 
of thinking congeal over time into taken-for-granted, normatively privileged 
worldviews that structure behavior and thus prove hard to dislodge—but 
(and this is the critical part) nonetheless contain contradictions that may be 
exploited to redistributive ends (5–6). As one example, neoliberalism asserts 
a minimalist role for the state, which may exacerbate inequality, but also 
expresses fealty to the rule of law, which may create advocacy opportunities. 
From this institutionalist stance, the Stones of Hope contributors weave 
stories that might be best understood as accounts of interest group politics. 
The picture is primarily one of organizational actors, composed of lawyers 
and activists, who collaborate with community members to contest state and 
corporate power through a range of ESR strategies. What this means is that, as 
a methodological and analytical matter, the studies are not (generally speaking 
3. See White, supra note 1, at 763.
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at least) about the backgrounds, motivations, and possible contradictions of 
the lawyer-activists themselves.4 Rather, they are about how organizational 
actors, embedded in communities, use the legal and political levers at hand—
deploying what the authors call “strategies of engagement”—to radiate power 
outward in an effort to ameliorate poverty and reform institutional practice 
(7).
From Hope to Action: The Mechanics of Social Change
Viewing Stones of Hope from this institutional perspective, I want to suggest 
how the mechanisms by which the book’s protagonists seek to reshape 
power map onto—and in many ways challenge—fundamental critiques of 
social change lawyering. In each case study, we can identify three significant 
social change encounters in which the power of law is mobilized to advance 
campaign objectives. These encounters occur: first, at the point of contact 
between lawyers and community members, when legal and political goals are 
formulated and tactics specified; second, at the point of confrontation by the 
community-lawyer coalition against the state, when the community asserts 
legal rights to challenge state practice; and third, at the point of remedial state 
action directed back toward the community, when state power is exercised to 
redress the community’s claim. In each of these encounters, power is exercised, 
giving rise to tensions that form the basis for three important critiques of legal 
mobilization: what I shall refer to as the critiques of lawyer accountability, of 
rights, and of legal implementation. My aim here is to show how the social 
change encounters illuminated in Stones of Hope correspond to these critiques—
and how the advocates in the stories seek to engage and navigate the concerns 
they raise. In the end, I suggest that Stones of Hope moves us decisively beyond 
the enervating progressive distrust of lawyering toward an inspirational, yet 
politically grounded, model of how law may meaningfully contribute to social 
change. However, in so doing, it leaves some important questions unanswered. 
Specifically, while the book provides rich and innovative responses to the 
critique of rights and legal implementation, it does not forcefully engage the 
issue of lawyer accountability.
Let me start by sketching the mechanisms of social change embedded in 
the book—what Houtzager and White refer to as the “long arc of pragmatic 
ESR advocacy” (172). The Stones of Hope project is organized around four 
detailed case studies: SERAC’s campaign to resist evictions in Badia, Nigeria 
(17–41); TAC’s HIV/AIDS campaign in South Africa (51–90); the LHRC’s 
campaign to compensate victims of evictions in Tanzania (91–121); and the 
LRC health care campaign in Ghana (122–145) (note the pattern of issues: 
land, health, land, health). All of these campaigns follow a particular (though 
4. In this sense, White and Perelman’s account is, for example, very different from that of 
Dezalay and Garth, who are primarily interested in how lawyers’ quest for justice aligns 
with their simultaneous quest for status. See Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, Asian Legal 
Revivals: Lawyers in the Shadow of Empire (Univ. of Chicago Press 2010).
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never precisely identical) social change logic marked by a sequence of the 
three crucial encounters outlined above.
The first occurs when the lawyers encounter affected communities—Badia 
in Nigeria, the broad constituency of poor South Africans with HIV/AIDS, 
the Nyamuma in Tanzania, and Nima in Ghana. These encounters create 
the “generative spaces” (183) in which lawyers engage community members 
to (1) identify or “name” social problems; (2) “frame” the deprivation and 
demand for redress in the most resonant and practically useful legal-political 
lexicon; and (3) develop pragmatic advocacy responses—the “strategies of 
engagement” by which the activists plan to move the campaign forward. I will 
return momentarily to this first encounter, but let me briefly note a few of its 
features. One, the forces that draw lawyers and communities together have 
a consistently global texture: evictions pursuant to a World Bank-sponsored 
project in Nigeria, the refusal of multinational drug manufacturers to permit 
widespread use of generic antiretroviral drugs in South Africa, global eco-
tourism in Tanzania, and the impact of structural adjustment on the health 
system in Ghana. Second, the focus of these encounters is to directly enlist 
community members at the grassroots level in a process of mutual exchange 
and education in order to activate community participation in the campaign.
The generation of movement energy and strategic planning then leads to 
the second social change encounter, in which the now-formed lawyer-activist-
community coalition intervenes in the political world to advance mutually 
agreed upon goals. It is here that lawyers and communities identify the 
available political and legal “hooks” to leverage pressure on state and corporate 
actors to advance claims of redistributive justice. A key insight of the book is 
that lawyers and activists at this stage view traditional court-centered advocacy 
as one tool among many in a multifaceted political campaign. They neither 
discount it nor privilege it, but instead deploy it when they think it will provide 
leverage in the overall struggle. Litigation is thus a means, not an end—but still 
an important means. It is in this sense that the lawyers are considered to be 
engaged in “pragmatic” rights-claiming. They understand the limits of rights 
strategies, but use them when they are perceived to be the best available tool—
even if they do not always succeed. Consider the invocation of rights across 
the four campaigns:
• SERAC’s petition to the World Bank Inspection Panel (which resulted 
in an ultimately inadequate response), followed by a federal lawsuit, 
which resulted in an injunction that was disregarded.
• TAC’s successful court challenge to the South African government’s 
refusal to permit the provision of antiretroviral drugs (to prevent 
mother-to-child HIV/AIDS transmission) to a handful of pilot sites, 
which did not overcome HIV/AIDS denialist opposition, but gave 
TAC crucial leverage with reformist officials in ultimately negotiating 
a clinic-focused national treatment plan. (Note here that it was the 
fortuitous illness of the resistant Minister of Health that triggered 
the final resolution in favor of a comprehensive national antiretroviral 
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treatment plan (76). The arduous and persistent TAC campaign laid the 
political and legal groundwork to take advantage of this opportunity.)
• LHRC’s petition to the Tanzania Commission on Human Rights 
and Good Governance, which did not stop evictions or provide 
compensation.
• And LRC’s habeas petition on behalf of Mohammed Zakari, which also 
asserted a human rights claim challenging Ghana’s inadequate system 
of health care funding for the poor, and ultimately led to Zakari’s 
release.
It is important to highlight the following aspects of these legal campaigns. 
First, the campaigns are multi-tiered in that they are targeted at venues both 
inside and above the state: national courts in South Africa and Ghana, the 
World Bank panel in Nigeria and internationally funded Human Rights 
Commission in Tanzania. Second, the use of rights is strategically and self-
consciously geared to achieve the overall result. The advocates are sensitive to 
over-claiming rights. The best example of this came out in the TAC campaign, 
in which TAC framed the legal claim as a negative right—to be free of the 
government’s refusal to permit antiretroviral treatment beyond pilot sites—as 
opposed to an affirmative right to adequate HIV/AIDS treatment. This was 
a deliberate choice that was skillfully executed, ultimately resulting in the 
court accepting the negative right asserted (63). The third point is that the 
rights-claiming in these campaigns is always coordinated with other tactics: 
media strategies (in Badia), active political lobbying (in the TAC campaign), 
petition gathering (in Zakari’s case), and civil disobedience (in all cases). The 
campaigns therefore show multidimensional advocacy in full force.
In the wake of a successful ESR campaign, there is a third, iterative, encounter, 
when the state mobilizes its power to bring change back to the community 
level. This encounter raises two issues. One is how the state implements legal 
victories; the other is how community members are continuously engaged in 
the implementation process. Sometimes there simply is no implementation. 
In the Tanzania example, the state disregarded the commission’s order to 
compensate displaced villagers. But other times, implementation is robustly 
community-based. In the TAC example, the key implementation issues were 
training clinic personnel, especially in rural areas, to administer antiretroviral 
treatment and educating those with HIV/AIDS on their treatment regimens. 
As the authors suggest, TAC’s grassroots practice “prefigured” (189) the 
institutional response in a way that enhanced implementation: TAC’s on-
the-ground commitment to clinic-based and community-led antiretroviral 
treatment programs was ultimately adopted as a model for South Africa’s 
national HIV/AIDS treatment plan (76). In this way, a role for ongoing 
community engagement was built into the policy response.
It is the power of ongoing community mobilization that is key to the Stones 
of Hope analysis. The goal of these campaigns is, ultimately, to activate the 
community so that they sustain the struggle for justice after the campaign 
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passes. It is here that Perelman and Young’s “rights as footprints” (122–23) 
notion becomes a central metaphor of the book. The assertion of rights and 
the achievement of shifting power is imprinted upon the collective community 
consciousness and retold in ways that sustains and re-motivates activism over 
time.
From Action to Theory: The Specter of Accountability 
Understanding how the arc of pragmatic advocacy occurs across these 
pivotal social change encounters (lawyer–community, lawyer/community–
state, state–community) allows us to then examine how they relate to three 
fundamental, and familiar, critiques about the scope and power of legal 
activism. These critiques raise concerns about (1) the degree of lawyer 
accountability to communities in social change contexts, (2) the political 
risks of rights claiming, and (3) the effective enforcement of legal victories. I 
suggest that the central theoretical contribution of Stones of Hope is to challenge 
two of these critiques (of rights and legal implementation), while leaving the 
third (of accountability) unanswered.
I begin by outlining how the social change encounters identified above 
create the very conditions upon which the critiques are predicated. The first 
encounter, in which empowered lawyers engage disempowered communities 
around the project of social transformation, gives rise to the critique of 
accountability. Here the familiar concern is that lawyers set the social change 
agenda, make strategic decisions based on their own priorities, or privilege the 
views of one sector of a broader constituency, as in Bell’s classic critique of the 
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund.5
The second critique relates to the execution of legal strategy during the 
encounter between the community, their lawyers, and the state, in which 
lawyers assert rights in front of an adjudicative body with the aim of changing 
law to redress the community’s grievance. In the critique of rights, this type of 
rights-claiming is viewed as politically dangerous because it individualizes 
grievances and thus fragments collective action by channeling it into slow-
moving and demobilizing courts.6
The third critique—now at the remedial stage of state enforcement—may 
be called the critique of legal implementation, which is premised upon the classic 
disjunction between law on the books and law in action. Here, the concern, 
captured by Scheingold’s “myth of rights”7 and Rosenberg’s “hollow hope,”8 
5. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School 
Desegregation Litigation, 85 Yale L.J. 470, 489–91 (1976).
6. Orly Lobel, The Paradox of Extralegal Activism: Critical Legal Consciousness and 
Transformative Politics, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 938 (2007).
7. Stuart A. Scheingold, The Politics of Rights: Lawyers, Public Policy, and Political Change 
(Yale Univ. Press 1974).
8. Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? (Univ. 
of Chicago Press, 2d ed. 2008).
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is that judicial pronouncements do not easily translate into change on the 
ground because of bureaucratic impediments to enforcement and the potential 
for backlash. Therefore, lawyers may be lured into misguided legal strategies 
when other forms of political action might be more effective.
What does Stones of Hope have to say about these critiques? A lot, it turns out, 
about rights and implementation, but very little about accountability. Let me 
address the critiques in reverse order.
With respect to the critique of legal implementation, the studies in the book 
offer a rich and compelling account that both accepts this critique, but then 
offers ways of moving beyond it. It is at the point of legal victory, in many 
ways, that the Stones of Hope campaigns start. The campaigns are thus organized 
around fulfilling the promise of the legal victory through what McCann calls 
legal leveraging: negotiating policy concessions, influencing public opinion 
in the media, and using the victory to stimulate grassroots energy.9 It is at the 
grassroots level, then, that the hard work to implement and sustain victories 
occurs. The lawyers accept this as a critical starting part of their work. They are 
not bewitched by court pronouncements and lured into a false sense of law’s 
formal power. To the contrary, the lawyers are self-consciously antiformalist 
and pursue legal change in the context of overarching strategies of ongoing 
political struggle.
There is the question of whether the lawyers and activists ultimately 
succeed in this regard and here I think the record from Stones of Hope is a bit 
less clear. For example, take TAC’s case. Although the case study discusses 
the formulation of the national treatment plan and allocation of resources to 
support it (86), we are not told in any detail how the plan has played out on 
the ground. Similarly, in the Zakari case, we are told that the user fee health 
care system is ultimately disregarded in favor of national health insurance, 
and that LRC was involved in this process (144). But the linkage between 
the campaign and this resolution is not clearly specified. Overall, we are told 
that democratic and experimentalist practice on the ground presages the 
institutional design of programs to come. However, just how that process 
works is less clear, leaving the reader with a question: How does prefiguring 
actually end up transfiguring?
When it comes to engaging the critique of rights, the book makes perhaps 
its strongest contribution by moving us beyond the debilitating debate about 
whether rights help or hinder movements to show how they can be used 
as resources to spur political action. The central framing of the project is 
“reclaiming human rights,” which suggests a deep engagement on the part of 
the lawyers with the limits and risks of rights strategies and a commitment to 
carrying them out with sensitivity to the pluralism of local political discourse 
and rights’ potentially imperialistic overtones. It is fair to ask whether the turn 
toward “pragmatic” rights claiming—which might be viewed as incrementalist 
9. Michael McCann, Law and Social Movements, in The Blackwell Companion to Law and 
Society, at 506, 514 (Austin Sarat ed., Wiley–Blackwell 2004).
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and too focused on discrete policy achievements—is ultimately the “best” form 
of transformative politics. However, this type of criticism always requires an 
analysis of the viability of alternative political options, without which we are 
left to judge political success against an untested—and perhaps untestable—
ideal.
The book does, however, leave open some fundamental questions about 
the critique of accountability. In its commitment to foregrounding the 
agency and voices of the community members involved, it tends to obscure 
the voices and stories of the lawyers. I suspect that this is a deliberate, and 
in many ways refreshing, choice. However it is one with consequences for 
our understanding of one of the ultimate advocacy objectives: community 
empowerment. Generally speaking, the lawyers in the stories are hidden 
behind their organizations. What are their backgrounds and motivations? 
How did it come to pass that they adopted such innovative, pragmatic views of 
advocacy? How did they develop and hone their strategies? By deemphasizing 
the advocate, we are left to wonder about how closely their interests map onto 
their clients’ interests and how accountable they might be. It is often asserted 
that lawyer and community interests match up, but it is not clear how that 
match was achieved and how contested it might be. For example, in the case 
of Tanzania, the decision to file with the Commission on Human Rights and 
Good Governance is accepted as the product of consensus, but it is not clear 
what informed that decision.
More broadly, the important fact that White and Perelman, along with 
other elite Harvard Law School students, were central actors in many of the 
stories told in the book raises important questions about how that encounter, 
across a vast expanse of space, culture, race, class, and power, was managed 
and what the points of tension were. Potential divisions and tensions are 
downplayed in presenting stories of advocacy and outcomes. But in so doing, 
we do not learn how the tricky process of community engagement is sustained 
over time. In the end, the book leaves us with a theory of change bereft of a 
theory of accountability. That, of course, does not ultimately detract from its 
seminal achievements, but it does raise precisely the sorts of questions and 
concerns about lawyer power that White so eloquently surfaced in her early 
work. Particularly to the extent that this book speaks to the next generation 
of progressive lawyers eager to understand how to effectively engage poor 
communities in transformative politics, it would be useful to learn more 
about the processes and practices that successfully forged the Stones of Hope 
collaborations.
Conclusion
In the end, of course, no book can be all things to all people and any 
scholarly approach carries its own tradeoffs. We may focus on what a work 
does not do only to devalue what it does. That would be a grave mistake 
here, not only for those who study lawyering for social change but for those 
who actually carry it out. Stones of Hope is, in the final analysis, a stunning 
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achievement that lives up to its brilliantly evocative title. It is, in my view, 
essential reading not only for those who care about the sociology of law, but 
for all students and practitioners who care about using law to make the world 
more just and humane. In this sense, Stones of Hope is a model of what legal 
scholarship should be: academically rigorous and—most importantly—deeply 
engaged in the project of social justice. That is the stone that we all should 
carry forth.
